Monday, 15 December 2014

Skepticism: Ancient 'East' and Modern 'West' - PART I & II

Bina Gupta

A careful examination of the Cārvāka School of ancient Indian materialism reveals a number of interesting parallels to a relatively modern school of western thought, the type of skepticism first formulated by David Hume, to mention only one example. The purpose of this paper is to examine and contrast the respective epistemologies which these two schools developed and, in particular, the similarities and differences in their skeptical outlooks.

For the sake of clarity, the paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I will attempt to define skepticism and also distinguish between what I will call extreme skepticism and limited skepticism. In the second part, I will describe and analyze skepticism in Indian philosophy with special reference to the Cārvāka School. In the third part, I will note similarities and differences between the two. I will conclude by pointing out the value of skepticism in both traditions by demonstrating its unsettling effect on traditional viewpoints and its effect on those who hold the older positions.

I

What is skepticism? There seems to be no generally accepted definition of skepticism in philosophical circles. On the one hand, the frequent usage of terms like 'skeptic', 'skeptical', 'skepticism', gives the impression that we understand what we mean by these terms, but, on the other hand, the fact that the concept of skepticism is used in so many varied and sometime conflicting ways would seem to indicate that there is no single universally accepted understanding of the meaning of this term. For this reason, perhaps the safest and best way to begin is by offering a definition of skepticism: skepticism is a doubting or challenging of knowledge claims.  In other words, a skeptic is one who questions or call into doubts knowledge claims. In the West, knowledge is generally understood as involving belief. One may be said to have the knowledge that r if he believes that r, r is true, and has proof that r is true. In other words, it is a proposition which is either true or false, and the knowledge claim implies that the knower believes a true proposition. Without this claim the question of knowledge will not arise and a skeptic performs no useful function because there is noting to doubt or dispute about. Some skeptics, most notably David Hume, take this position a step further and make the stronger claim that it is not possible for the human understanding to discover the real nature of things as they exist in themselves, independent of experience.

Sextus Empiricus (Circa 200 AD), a Greek philosopher, divided philosophers into three groups: those claim that they have discovered the truth, i.e. the dogmatists; those who claim that the truth cannot be discovered. i.e. the Academicians; and those who do not make either of these claims but go on inquiring, i.e. the skeptics or Phyrrohonists.[1] The Greek terms skeptic meant an inquirer. Thus skepticism, as philosophical doubt rather than as doubts concerning traditional religious beliefs or traditions originated in ancient Greek thought.  

Extreme skepticism, as a philosophical position, called into question all knowledge claims which go beyond one's immediate experience. This calls into question the very basis of skepticism itself; for the skeptic claims that if there is any truth at all, the truth is that there is no truth. If an extreme skeptic intends to negate all knowledge claims, how does he know that his own claim is valid? On the other hand, if he does not know that the evidence for his claim is valid, he has no basis for skepticism.

Partial or limited skepticism call into question specific knowledge claims made either by metaphyscians or theologians which go beyond their immediate experience. Limited or partial skepticism can, therefore, be considered as an attempt to establish the necessary criteria which a valid knowledge claim must satisfy. Extreme skepticism maintains that no knowledge beyond immediate experience is possible, whereas in its weaker form skepticism expresses the doubt whether any particular knowledge claim can be know with certainty.

With this general introduction about skepticism and two kinds of skepticism, I will turn my attention to skepticism in Indian though and the role skepticism has played in the Cārvāka School.

II

An examination of the history of Indian philosophical though reveals that skepticism has not played a very important and prominent part in that history. Though one finds many references to skeptics scattered throughout the Indian literature, and despite the fact that the existence of a school of skepticism known as Lokāyata or Cārvāka is acknowledge by such scholars as Tucci, Dasgukpta and Garbe, it is well known that very few writings by Indian ancient skeptics have actually survived. The lack of positive wrings by Cārvāka has even caused some to question whether any Lokāyata text had ever existed. However, there is no doubt that actual Lokāyata texts existed in ancient times, although they are now lost. Tucci states that from the fact that no Lokāyata work came down to us it would be incorrect to assume that no Lokāyatatext ever existed.[2] Professor S. N. Dasgupta has given conclusive evidence that the Lokāyata sūtras with its commentary existed in ancient times.[3] The principal sources of information on skepticism is the writings of those who either sought to refute it or ridicule it. Thus the Lokāyataa philosophy (doctrine) has been preserved for us only as quoted in pūrvapakas, i. e., the objections raised against it by its opponents. One source of information on Cārvāka is the brief summary given by Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha.[4] In recent years, however, the Tattvopalavasimha by Jayarasi Bhatta, has been considered by its editors on the basis of internal evidence, to be the only authentic surviving text of this school[5], and most Indian scholars now share this opinion. However, this single text does not provide an adequate indication of the full reasoning and argumentation of the doctrines of the Carvaka School. Nevertheless, a careful reading of these resources leaves no doubt that the Carvaka School represents the standpoint of skepticism in Indian philosophy. My account of the skepticsim of the Carvaka School is based on these two sources.

Madhava attributes to the Carvakas the view that perception is the only sources of valid knowledge. They reject the authority of the Vedas, the supremacy of the Brahmin Caste and, the law of karma, and advocate egoistic hedonism in ethics. In the opening lines of his book Madhava states:
The efforts of carvaka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain -
While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
when once this fame ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?
The mass of men, in accordance with the sastras of policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Carvaka. Hence another name for that school is Lokayata - a name well accordant with the thing signified.[6]
Madhava emphasizes the epistemological basis of the Carvaka skepticism. What is perceived by means of five senses is valid. Inference cannot be regarded as a source of valid knowledge because inference is possible only when the concomitance between sadhya (major) and the hetu (middle) is know to be existing in the paksa (minor). This concomitance must not be only unconditional but also there should be no doubt in the mind that it could be conditional. Inference cannot take place until this concomitance is known. In Madhava's words:
Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute of any condition accepted or disputed; and this connection does not possess its power of causing inferene by virtue of its existence, as the eye, & c, are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being  known[7]?
One cannot know it by perception because concomitance is not something with which the senses can come into contact. Moreover, the contact between the senses and the object gives us only knowledge of the particular object in contact with our senses, and this contact cannot produce the universal connection between the sadhya and the hetu. This argument clearly states that perception only gives us knowledge of particulars. And as the scope of perception is limited to particulars only, it cannot provide us with the necessary connection required for a valid inference.

Inference as a means of knowing vyapti is also rejected because it is itself dependent upon a vyapti. "Nor can inference be the means of the knowledge of the universal propositon, since in the case of this inference we should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an ad infinitum retrogression.'[8]

Sabala (testimony) and upamana (comparison) cannot help us in knowing the universal relation between sadhya and hetu because they are themselves based on inference. Thus Madhava concludes: "Hence by the impossiblity of knowing the universality of a proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, & c."[9] That for Carvakas the move from the proposition 'y cannot be known' to the proposition  'y does not exist' commits the fallacy of 'argumentum ad ignoratium' i.e. argument from ignorance. Ignorance of how to prove or disprove a proposition establishes neither the falsehood nor the truth of that proposition, which is to say that on the basis that something is not know to exist one cannot claim that it does not exist.

It is obvious, however, that if one accepted the view that inference is impossible, it would be very difficult to account for the fact that in everyday life we rely on reason and, based on the results obtained, judge that belief well founded and necessary (the criterion used in practice);: in other words, without the type of reasoning which the Carvaka wants toreject everyday life would be impossible. Each of us intuitively recognize that without inference it is impossible to explain everyday practice. In short, the Carvaka's position seems to contradict everything we think we now to be true about reality. Moreover, this viewpoint actually places its adherents in a difficult position because nay proof that is given to prove the conrrectnes of his position will require inference. How can a Carvaka prove his assertion that perception is the only means of valid knowledge? At this point,he find only two alternatives are open to him. Either he accepts the validity of inference as a means of valid knowledge or refuses to recognize even perception as a source of valid knowledge. Both these positions have in face been taken, the first by Purandara and the second by Jayarasi Bhatta.

Purandara, probably a seventh century Carvaka, admits the validity of inference in regard to the perceptible world but denies its applicability beyond the realm of perceptual experience. Dasgupta hold that Purandara
admits the usefulness of inference in determining the nature of all worldly things where perceptual experience is available; but inference cannot be employed for establishing any dogma regarding the transcendental world, or life after death, or the law of karma which cannot be available to ordinary perceptual experience. [10]
Perhaps the rationale behind maintaining the distinction between the usefulness of inference in our everyday experience and in ascertaining truths beyond perceptual experience lies in the fact that an inductive generalization is made by observing a large number of cases of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, and since agreement in presence cannot be preserved in the transcendental world even if such a world existed, no inductive generalization relating to that world can be made. 

A Carvaka, like Purandara accepts perception and inference on the empirical level and discards metaphysical inference on the grounds that what is in principle unobservable  is unknowable. Other Carvaka, who accept only perception, leave themselves open to two questions: (1) How is validity of perception as a source of knowledge be ascertained? and (2) How do we ascertain the invalidity of other means of knowledge, accepted by most of the schools of Indian philosophy?

Perhaps, these questions led the Carvakas like Jayarasi Bhatta to focus on the questions of the validity of perception as a source of knowledge. He maintains that
the system of knowables depends upon the system of means of knowledge; while means of knowledge in order to be valid have to conform to reality. So one has to examine whether there are any valid means of knowledge before one can say anything about reality. Jayarasi is of the opinion that there are no valid means of knowledge...[11]
Jayarasi shows the invalidity of the pramanas and the consequent invalidity of all metaphysical princples and categories.

Lokayatas base their skepticism on the assumptions that material objects exist and that they are perceived. Everything in this world is reducible to the four elements, air, water, fire and earth. Everything arises out of a combination of these four elements and dissolution consists in their separation. But Jayarasi contends that there is no valid ground for accepting the existence of material elements, because if perception is the only valid source of knowledge, how can one be certain that perception reveals the true nature of objects? Perception itself cannot be regarded as the means for ascertaining the validity of perception. Thus, it is not surprising that the view propounded by Jayarasi was called tattvopaplava0vada. The title literally means 'the lion that throws overboard all categories'. The title is appropriate as the main thesis of the book demonstrates the impossibility of establishing the truth of any view of reality.

Jayarasi's skepticism is not based on the affirmation of any higher metaphysical truths. His skepticism does not permit him to claim a metaphysical basis by means of which he can reject different metaphysical theories. Instead, he employs dialectical argument to disprove his opponent's thesis. Like Sextus Empiricus, Jayarasi starts with his opponents concepts, suggests various alternative definitions, shows that some of the definitions are inapplicable, and that others lead to contradictions. His entire world is devoted to the discussion of these problems in epistemology. He challenges the validity of the theories of knowledge put forward by Mimamsa, Buddhism, Nyaya and uses the same method throughout. For example, he does not claim to know that perception is an invalid source of knowledge. Rather, he starts with a specific claim, e.g, the definition of perception as given in the Nyayasutras: perception is that which "arises from contact between sense-organ and object, is determinate (avyapadesiyam), non-erroneous (avyabhicari), and non-erratic (vyavasayatmakam)."[12]

Jayarasi focuses his criticism on the therm "avyabhicari" (non-erroneousness) known, which occurs in the Nyaya definition of perception. The non-erroneousness is, of course, not know by perception, because perception  always involves perception of an object and the non-erroneousness of perception is not an object. Neither can it be know through inference because such an inference in itself would have to be based on perception, which will make it a case of petitio. Thus, as the non-erroneousness of perception cannot be established, either by perception or by inference, it cannot be regarded as a means of valid knowledge.

Having demonstrated the impossibility of perception, he uses the same method to attempt to show the invalidity of all pramanas. Since we cannot establish any valid source of knowledge, we cannot claim that material objects exist. In short, Jayarasi's view represents the standpoint of extreme skepticism which holds that neither any epistomological nor any ontological category is possible. This theory rejects the vedic dogma which, on the basis of sabda (testimony) and anumana (inference), claims to establish the existence of the soul, life after death, etc. This skepticism also undercuts the dogmatism of both forms of materialism discussed above. Jayarasi rejects the two distinguishing features attributed to the Lokayatikas in the Indian philosophical literature: (1) sense-perception as the only valid means of knowledge, and (ii) the reality of the four well-known elements. Thus, Jayarasi's text contains an outright rejection of materialism and represents a thoroughgoing skepticism.

This raises some very important questions about the basis of skepticism itself. Skeptics such as Jayarasi reject their opponents knowledge claims, and suspend all judgements about truth and reality because the evidence supporting the knowledge claim is inadequate. However, if the skeptic is to doubt everything, then, to be consistent he must also doubt the basis of his doubt which make it impossible for skepticism to establish the validity of its own claims. An extreme skeptic, in other words, must be skeptical about his own position. If he does not doubt his skepticism, his own philosophical system is guilty of being inconsistent, i.e., it demands greater rigour of other system than it does of its own.
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Having presented this overview of the skepticism of the Carvaka School, I will now proceed, in the next section o this paper to briefly state the basic structure of David Hume's epistemology and the nature of his skepticism.

NOTES:


  1. Sextus Empiricus, translated by R.G.Bury, Vol. I, Outlines of pyrrhonism (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1933), P. 3 
  2. G. Tucci, "A Sketch of Indian Materialsim", Prceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress, V. I, 1925, p. 36 
  3. S.N. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 3 (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1976), p. 516 
  4. SarvaDarsana Samgrah, translated by E.B.Cowell and A.E.Gough (London: Kegan Paul, Trech, Trubner and Co. Ltd, Chapt. I 
  5. Jayarasi Bhatta, Tattvopaplavasimha, edited by Pandit Sukhalji Sanghvi and Rasiklal C. Parikh, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Np. LXXXVII 
  6. Madhava, p.2
  7. Ibid., p.5
  8. Ibid., p.6
  9. Ibit., p.9
  10. Dasgupta, p.536
  11. Jayarasi Bhatta, p.xii
  12. K.N.Jayatileke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1963), p.87

This essay was first published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. IX, No.1, October 1981

Click here for Part III  of this essay

At the time of publication of this essay, the author, Bina Gupta, was with Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia.


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Sunday, 14 December 2014

The Wolf’s Footprints: Indian Materialism in Perspective - PART II

An Annotated Conversation with Ramkrishna Bhattacharya

Krishna Del Toso



Krishna Del Toso:

Indeed, we meet with materialistic perspectives in texts belonging to quite different fields: Āyurveda, Mahābhārata, Upaniṣads... I would also add Ṛgveda and Atharvaveda just to stress antiquity of Indian Materialism in general. In this respect, one of the aspects that first impressed me when I read your book, is the incredible number and variety of sources you have checked. The first time I skimmed through the vast bibliography of primary sources of your book I felt the need of reflecting upon that which could be called a methodological sieve. In other terms, when one has to work on such an amount of sources, I think that the preliminary and essential consideration that s/he must keep in mind is to be deeply aware of the difference existing between real quotations and spurious quotations, namely, between fragments of Cārvāka/Lokāyata, and fragments on Cārvāka/Lokāyata. To make a simple example, the presence for instance of the Sanskrit particle iti after a quotation cannot be considered always discriminating: we cannot in fact be sure that when we come across an iti we are undoubtedly in front of an actual citation. Such an awareness is extremely important, since the real import of Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy can be restored or defined only or primarily on the basis of the fragments of Cārvāka/Lokāyata, because the fragments on Cārvāka/Lokāyata present the risk to be mixed up with interpretations that could occasionally be misleading. According to your experience, hence, which are the principal misunderstandings that we have or we have had on Indian Materialism? In other words, what am I asking you is to tell us, on the one hand, which are the aspects of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy that have been wrongly (intentionally or unintentionally) interpreted by Indian philosophers of the past and, on the other hand, which errors of evaluation in the modern understanding of Cārvāka/Lokāyata are due to a wrong or, better said, an inaccurate reading of these past misinterpretations.

RB: Two aspects of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata perspectives have been wrongly interpreted by Indian philosophers. First, the Cārvāka has been portrayed as pramāṇaikavādin, admitting one and only one instrument of cognition, namely, perception. This is not correct. One of the earliest commentators of the Cārvākasūtras known to us is Purandara. Like Bhāvivikta he too was apparently a cirantana cārvāka, adhering to the exact meaning of the words of the aphorisms. One Cārvāka aphorism says that perception indeed is the instrument of cognition. It is from his commentary, as quoted by Kamalaśīla, that we find him declaring that the Cārvākas did not consider anumāna (inference) as such to be invalid, but admitted only such inferences as were current in the world. Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa followed suit in dividing inference into two categories: the first limited to the everyday world, the other following from the scriptures. Thus the Cārvākas with different inclinations and opinions in other respects were unanimous in accepting limited validity of inference, ‘limited’ in the sense that only such inferences as were based on, or verifiable by perception are to be admitted as an extension of perception. They drew the line there.
In this connection I would like to quote a few words from an article by Stephen H. Phillips that provides the background of the Indian philosophers’ preoccupation with the issue of inference. Speaking of the Indian views of knowledge he says: «Buddhist and some others appear to be motivated to deny pramāṇa status to testimony because appeal to testimony is used to justify what they see as objectionable religious theses. Similarly, the Cārvāka materialist denies inference, apparently out of fear of its power to prove the existence of spiritual entities such as God or the soul».[1]
It may also be noted in passing that the position of the Nyāyasūtras is not different. Inference is to be preceded by perception.[2] Vātsyāyana smuggles scripture (āgama, the Vedas) in his commentary as something on a par with perception. He writes: «The inference that is not contradicted by perception and scripture is called anvīkṣā».[3] Earlier too he states: «The inference which is contradicted by perception and scripture is pseudo-nyāya».[4] The inclusion of ‘scripture’ takes the bottom out of the Nyāya definition of perception and inference. At the same time, Vātsyāyana admits indirectly, there is such a thing called pseudo-nyāya. The Cārvākas wanted to guard their position by rejecting all such pseudo-nyāyas based on scripture and verbal testimony of any so-called authoritative person. Their position differs from Nyāya and others who admitted several instruments of cognition in that, unlike them, the Carvakas did not accept inference or word as an independent and primary instrument but as secondary, dependent on perception.


Krishna Del Toso:

And as regards the second aspect?

RB: Well, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata is widely misrepresented as a philosophy of gross Hedonism. Hemacandra, Guṇaratna and others have maligned it in the worst conceivable manner. I have already spoken of a verse attributed to the Cārvākas: yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā gṛthaṃ pibet («So long as you live, live happily; eat ghee, clarified butter, even by running into debts»). The original reading of the verse was quite different: yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ («So long as you live, live happily; nothing is beyond the ken of death»).[5] Sāyaṇa-Mādhava himself quotes the original verse at the beginning of his exposition of the Cārvāka but distorts the reading at the end of the same chapter. This made me curious and I started to locate all the occurrences of this verse in other works. I found that everyone except Sāyaṇa-Mādhava has cited the original reading or, even if some have rewritten it, they have not spoken of eating ghee or anything of that sort. Yet this distorted version is generally accepted as the quintessence of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Of course the Cārvākas, unlike the Buddhists, did not believe that the world is all sorrow. Nor did they believe that people can attain happiness only after being released from the cycle of rebirth, for they did not believe in after-life or rebirth. Sāyaṇa-Mādhava himself states that the Cārvākas were conscious of both pleasure and pain in life and they chose pleasure, not pain, as some ascetics intentionally do. This is the normal way of living and does not imply unbridled search for sensual pleasure.
Moreover, those who have charged the Cārvāka/Lokāyata on this ground never refer to any authentic aphorism. All references are to this verse only. Serious philosophers like Śāntarakṣita, Śaṅkarācārya and Prabhācandra controverted the Cārvāka/Lokāyata on purely epistemological grounds, never accusing them on moral ones. Even Jayantabhaṭṭa, who had a very low opinion about the intelligence of the Cārvāka philosophers, dismissed the charge of Hedonism by saying that ‘live happily’ is not a prescription. I have mentioned it before in my book.
These are the two mistaken notions about the Cārvāka/Lokāyata that the students of Indian philosophy should be disabused of.


Krishna Del Toso:

Now, after having shed light on the principal misconceptions concerning Indian Materialism, it is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the above-mentioned scarcity of fragments, from those very fragments the fundamental doctrines of this philosophy can, however, be drawn. Moreover, as you have said, we know also five or six proper names of exponents of Cārvāka/Lokāyata, like Aviddhakarṇa, Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, Purandara, etc., and from your study it clearly emerges that Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy was not a monolith, rather a dynamic perspective – as all other philosophies are or should be – with internal currents of thought and doctrinal differences. For instance, you have stressed the difference between ‘ancient’ Cārvākas, as Bhāvivikta, and ‘recent’ Cārvākas, as Udbhaṭa. Would it be possible, in your opinion, to summarize the main points of Cārvāka philosophy, tracing them back to these five or six philosophers by taking into account also the fundamental differences among their perspectives?

RB: First of all, it must be made clear that the Cārvāka/Lokāyata is not the only materialist philosophy in India. There were more than one pre-Cārvāka materialist schools, as I have mentioned before.


Krishna Del Toso:

Yes.

RB: In spite of other differences, some of the basic materialist tenets are common to all of them, such as: the world has no creator, it consists only of natural elements, there is no after-life (that is, heaven and hell), matter precedes consciousness which is but a special effect of a particular combination of the elements, there is no soul without the body, and, what is more relevant in the Indian context, there is no rebirth. The Cārvāka aphorisms that are quoted and re-quoted state these fundamentals quite unambiguously. Then there are aphorisms concerning epistemology which declare perception to be the only instrument of cognition, excluding thereby inference drawn from testimony and declaring inference itself as secondary, not on a par with perception. But right from the eighth century we read of difference of opinions: for example, is consciousness ‘born’ or ‘manifested’ out of the four elements forming the body? Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa proposed to interpret some Cārvāka aphorisms in so untraditional a way that Cakradhara had to contrast him with Bhāvivikta, the old commentator. So did Vādidevasūri notice the novelty of Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s interpretations. These differences are quite prominent and cannot be explained away. As to the non-Cārvāka materialists, the major difference lies in determining the number of natural elements, four or five.
In regard to the social philosophy of the Cārvākas, we have no primary source to go by. Kṛṣṇamiśra and Śrīharṣa have made the Cārvākas appear as defenders of women’s rights and opposed to caste distinction. But there is no aphorism to support such representation. But as we have to reconstruct the whole system solely on the basis of its representation by its opponents, we may very well accept this charge as reflecting the true view of the Cārvākas.
Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭa introduced a number of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terms in their commentaries. It is not improbable that they composed their commentaries from their own Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, without being converted to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Udbhaṭa in particular comes closer to idealism in his explanation of an aphorism. This is not altogether unexpected. In our own times Pandit Ananta Kumar Bhattacharyya wrote an exposition of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata in 1365 Bengali era (1958-59 CE). An English translation of his essay has been provided in the Cārvāka/Lokāyata.[6] More recently Acarya Badarinatha Sukla, former Vice-Chancellor of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi, has tried (in Sanskrit) to defend dehātmavāda by following the method of Nyāya.[7] He has extolled the Cārvāka/Lokāyata as an appropriate philosophy for contemporary life.
These developments are of course quite interesting but whether they signify any ‘growth’ is, I am afraid, a matter of opinion. They do not help us reconstruct the original Cārvāka/Lokāyata or any other materialist doctrine that had flourished right from the Buddha’s time or even before. We need more hard facts. Exploration of Tibetan sources is a desideratum. I know that you are working in that field and would urge you and other scholars to search for new material that may throw more light on Indian Materialism through the ages.


Krishna Del Toso:

Indeed, to make just an example, I know that some interesting material on Lokāyata can be found in Avalokitavrata’s Ṭīkā on Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa, which remains only in its Tibetan translation. But let us come back to the various subjects towards which you are directing our attention. Among all the topics mentioned here, I think that the most important and, in some way, the ‘superordinated’ one, is the non-acceptance of those inferences (anumāna) that are not supported by (or grounded on) perception. It is easy to understand, indeed, how also other materialistic theories like, for instance, the denial of the self (ātman), or of the other-world (paraloka), depend on this particular interpretation of anumāna. This, again, makes the Cārvāka/Lokāyata be more a sort of ‘positivist’ or ‘scientific’ perspective – in the sense of a philosophy open to a real verification-modality –, than a philosophy of extreme Hedonism, as some ancient thinkers loved to describe it (of course some hedonistic fringe might also have existed among Cārvākas, as the yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven… verse mentioned above seems in some way to hint at; in any case, hedonistic inclinations seem to have been implicitly accepted even in Vaidik traditions, as for instance the Manusmṛti passage na māṃsabhakṣaṇe doṣo na madye na ca maithune | pravṛttireṣā bhūtānāṃ, «There is no sin in eating meat, in liquor and in sexual intercourse, for this is the natural way of creatures», bears witness to).[8] You have explained very well why Hedonism cannot be considered in se an inclination proper, or connaturated, to the Cārvāka viewpoint. Now, in Chapter IV of your book[9] you deal with all these arguments but, exactly because this is a crucial point, and even if you have partially discussed this in a previous answer, I ask you if you can explain more in detail in what the materialistic perspective on perception and inference does consist and how the, as it were, ‘positivist’ attitude just referred can be described. To develop a bit further this subject will be useful for my next question.

RB: Well, Materialism is intrinsically inductive in spirit. Any universal proposition has to be arrived at from particular instances. The methods of agreement and difference are essential to formulate a universal proposition. Even then the truth-value will at best be probable, not certain. Idealist philosophers insist on generalisations made out of deduction from scriptures, religious law books like the Manusmṛti, etc. They wished for truths beyond time, true for the past, the present and the future. Purandara and Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, even though he was a ‘revisionist’, insist on distinguishing between inference based on perception followed in everyday life and inference deduced from scripture. This I believe, is a contribution of the materialists to logic.
Was this the original position of the Cārvākas? Frauwallner says that they had to desert their original attitude and adopt foreign thoughts which led to «a regular activity and to a blossoming up of a literature richer than hitherto».[10] Franco is of the opinion that such a desertion happened in the wake of Dharmakīrti. He even goes to the extent of saying that Dharmakīrti’s arguments «had to be urgently answered, or the Cārvāka would have been kicked out of the philosophical scene» (Franco told me that the article had been written much earlier).[11] I, on the other hand, believe that the Cārvākas right from the beginning accepted the limited validity of inference; they did not modify their position in face of Dharmakīrti. Some pre-Cārvāka materialists might have adhered to the naïve position that sensory perception alone was the only valid instrument of cognition. The Cārvākas came late and developed a more sophisticated epistemology and ontology. Karin Preisendanz has very recently complained to me (in a personal communication) that my refusal to accept Frauwallner’s and Franco’s view «has the taste of anti-Buddhist sentiment often found in contemporary Indian writings on the history and development of Indian philosophy». All I can say is that, being a confirmed atheist and hence not an orthodox Hindu, I harbour no such anti-Buddhist sentiment. On the other hand, accepting the view of Franco would mean that the Cārvāka logicians were, as Vācaspatimiśra in his Bhāmatī ironically says,[12] indeed worse than the beasts because they could not infer anything even from everyday experience. What I have tried to show is that the Cārvāka materialists were expert logicians and had a cause to uphold. They were opposed to all religious practices and refused to believe in the infallibility of any religious text, whether the Vedas or the Buddhist canonical works. Since they denied both after-life and rebirth, they developed the concept of two different kinds of pratītis, utpanna and utpādya. The first is the kind of inference in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself (which is acceptable) and the other in which the inferential cognition is to be acquired on somebody else’s advice (which is not acceptable). There are two verses which bring out their position clearly:

yattvātmeśvara-sarvajṇā-paralokādigocaram |
anumāṇaṃ na tasyeṣṭaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ tattvadarśibhiḥ ||
(«However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, and omniscient being, the other-world and so on are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things»).

ṛjūnāṃ jāyate tasmānna tāvad anumeyadhīḥ |
yāvat kuṭilitaṃ ceto na teṣāṃ viṭatārkikaiḥ ||
(«Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of probandum by such inferences, so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians»).[13]

Being thoroughgoing rationalists the Cārvākas could not dispense with reasoning, which involves inference. That is why all fideists, religious teachers or law-givers such as Manu find fault with the haitukas, reasoners. The Cārvākas were of course non-believers, heretics, infidels or anything the believers might call them. But they were not fools, as Vācaspatimiśra, Jayantabhaṭṭa and Hemacandra superciliously brand them. They knew the technical terms of formal logic such as sādhya, pakṣa, gamaka, etc. and used them properly in their polemics. At the same time, they were against the ‘cunning logicians’ who by jugglery with words tried to convince people of the existence of such non-existent objects as God, omniscient being, after-life, etc.


Krishna Del Toso:

Very well! Your argument is very clear and you could not conclude it in a better way, since your words allow me to introduce the question to which I alluded before. Though the Cārvākas say that no means of knowledge can actually demonstrate the existence of the ātman, of an other-world, of karmic merits and demerits, etc., we find however that they do not deny – but how could they have done it? – the existence of a sort of principium individuationis (variously called caitanya, pudgala, etc.). In addition to that, the fact that they were not at all devoted to extreme Hedonism suggests to me that they must have had a precise and unique idea of morality/ethics, which should be completely different from other ideas of morality/ethics founded on principles somewhat spiritual (such as the Vaidikas’ sacrifice or the Buddhists’ karman, etc.). The question is: according to your opinion, which kind of morality/ethics did the Materialists develop, considering the fact that they lived without the assurance of the existence of a summum bonum (niḥśreyasa, nirvāṇa, etc.) as final aim of life? Furthermore, is it possible to gather the core aspects of this kind of morality/ethics? Can it be helpful, in order to unravel this point, to take into consideration those philosophies of ancient Greece that seem to be similar to Cārvāka/Lokāyata (I am thinking for instance to some aspects of the philosophies of Epicurus of Samos or of Zeno of Citium)?

RB: Unfortunately we have absolutely no evidence to answer your question properly. The fragments so far collected say practically nothing of the Cārvāka ethics. However, I have tried to show that the Cārvākas were as much maligned as Epicurus. Epicurus led an austere life yet the word ‘epicure’ in English (and may be in other modern European languages) is made to suggest unbridled enjoyment of food and drink, etc. It is possible that the Cārvāka ethics was akin to Epicurus’ who in a letter to Menoeceus once said:

When, therefore, we say that pleasure is a chief good…we mean the freedom of the body from pain and of the soul from confusion. For it is not…continue drinking and revels…that make life pleasant but sober contemplations which examine into the reasoning for all choice and avoidance, and which put to flight the vain opinions from which greater part of the confusion arises which troubles the soul.[14]

It is probable that the Cārvākas too believed in this view of life and held the pursuit of the real nature of things (as mentioned in a verse quoted above) to be the supreme aim of life. Incidentally, Epicurus’ words are reminiscent of the concept of heya (to be rejected) and upādeya (to be enjoyed) found in many Sanskrit works.
Franco once suggested perceptively: «…all the Lokāyatikas were fighting for… was ultimately to found social and political institutions independently of religious dogma…».[15] He might have had in his mind Frauwallner’s view that Materialism in India was created for the Realpolitikers.[16] I do not think so, as I have shown in the first chapter of my book. I would, however, heartily agree with Franco’s suggestion. The rationalism and secularism of the Cārvākas are relevant even today when irrationalism fostered by the postmodernists and fundamentalism fanned by reactionary politicians  are so rife all over the world.


Krishna Del Toso:

Good. You have shifted our argument to the present times. Let us continue on this direction. Today we are observing an increase of social frictions among the lower strata of the population, whereas the so-called intellectual élites (both religious and non-religious) are trying to find a common platform in order to develop a serious dialogue between cultures. This platform, of course, has to be based on the idea that the ‘other than me’ can represent more a richness for me, rather than a danger. And this richness of course should be handled without in any case loosing one’s own identity, otherwise it would not be an actual richness. This process should be in short described by making reference to our case: an Italian Doctor in Philosophy, me, is questioning an Indian Professor, you, on his last book on Cārvāka/Lokāyata; but this Indian Professor is also well versed in English literature and in ancient Greek philosophy, and this Italian Doctor is acquainted with the fundamental aspects of the doctrines and thoughts developed by ancient and medieval Indian thinkers. Our conversation is enriching me and, I hope, is enriching also you, without forcing the one or the other of us to abandon his own cultural identity. The point is that a real dialogue can exist only when the speakers involved in it are disposed to openly accept – of course with a proper criticism – the other’s points of view and consequently to through doubt upon, or to reconsider, one’s own ideas (without necessarily abandoning them!), when these ideas are with intelligence criticized by the other one. Of course, this is a difficult intellectual exercise, difficult to such an extent that rarely it has, or has had, a good application, and the case of Indian Materialism, which has been historically reduced to silence, is in my opinion a clear example of the failure of a philosophical dialogue. Nonetheless, I am convinced that the materialistic inclination towards life and knowledge in general could strongly contribute to the present ethical debate, by introducing new dialectical perspectives. Now, according to your opinion, in which way one should nowadays make the materialistic teachings of ancient and medieval India react with the other, mostly religious, ethical inclinations? Which are the aspects of Cārvāka/Lokāyata that can be considered still topical? Said in seriocomic words, I am giving to you the possibility to ‘avenge’ that which – at least from a Westers perspective – seems to have been a sort of historical ‘murder’ of Indian Materialism.

RB: Well, Indian Materialism might have been ‘murdered’ elsewhere, but it has always been a living presence in India, at least in Bengal. This may be true for other parts of India too. Thanks to the late Janakiballabha Bhattacharya, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Dakshinaranjan Bhattacharya Shastri, Hemanta Kumar Gangopadhyaya (Ganguly) who wrote mostly in Bangla, and others, Indian Materialism has never been absent from the philosophical scene here. Idealists of many hues, both religious and non-religious, had to reckon with Materialism both in classrooms and in their writings. I, in my own humble way, have contributed to the study of Materialism by writing more often in Bangla than in English. My Bangla book, Cārvākacarcā[17] is a collection of articles dealing with many issues not covered (or barely mentioned) in my Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. For example, a small work edited and translated by F.W. Thomas called Bṛhaspati Sūtra is no longer considered worth discussing in the West. But it has been taken more seriously in India due to the fact that scholars like Haraprasad Shastri and Dakshinaranjan Shastri referred to it. So I had to write something in Bangla to show that the work was full of self-contradictions and a forgery to boot. I have not written anything in English on the Jābāli episode in the Rāmāyaṇa (Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa) although Jābāli definitely represents pre-Cārvāka Materialism. Paraśurāma (pseudonym of Rājaśekhara Basu, a brilliant short story writer in Bangla), once wrote a classic story called Jābāli which is still enjoyed by all.[18] Thus Materialism has been made known to common readers as well. I, therefore, compared different recensions of the Rāmāyaṇa, more particularly the Gauḍīya version (it was first edited and translated into Italian by Gaspare Gorresio).[19] Similarly there is a late Sanskrit play, Vidvanmodataraṅgiṇī, a kind of a digest of all philosophies known to its author, Cirañjīva Śarmā (Bhaṭṭācārya) (to the best of my knowledge and belief, no relation of mine!). The play is not read much outside Bengal. But it has been translated more than once, both into Bangla and English. So I had to reckon with this work with a view to demonstrating that its author had mixed up all nāstikas (the Buddhists, the Jains and the Cārvākas) in his representation of Materialism. This way the study of Indian Materialism has never been dead in India, at least in Bengal.
I should add that recently there has been a resurgence of the study of Indian Materialism in Japan and the West as well, because of the new fillip given to it by Dharmakīrti studies, thanks to the works brought from Tibet by that great Marxist scholar-traveller, Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana. It is absolutely necessary to know the views of those whom Dharmakīrti and his commentators refer to. One has to learn in greater detail the views of Indian materialists and others whom they sought to refute. Franco’s monograph, Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth is a case in point.[20] One whole chapter in it, the fourth, is devoted to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata.
It is now impossible to forget all about Indian Materialism or dismiss it simply as a philosophy of reckless Hedonism.


Krishna Del Toso:

What I find reassuring on this point is that, also and mostly thanks to your work, Cārvāka philosophy can now be reconsidered in a thorough manner. Now, and this is my concluding question, I would like to ask you if you are still working on Cārvāka/Lokāyata and, if yes, in which direction are moving your studies, and which are the subjects that you are investigating at the moment?

RB: I am at present engaged in studying various aspects of the doctrine of svabhāva, a ‘lost’ philosophy that can be traced back to the time of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. I have already published a few papers in some Indian journals and one in the Halbfass Memorial Volume.[21] They, I hope, will throw more light on the ‘prehistory’ of Indian Materialism. I would like to find how and from when svabhāvavāda and the Cārvāka/Lokāyata coalesced, how svabhāva came to mean both accidentalism and determinism. As usual, the amount of material is scanty, so one has to fill in the gaps with reasonable conjectures.


Krishna Del Toso:

So, looking forward to reading your next book (why not a collection of essays on svabhāva?), I thank you again, dear professor, for this interesting conversation.

RB: Well, I do plan to prepare a book exactly on this subject in near future.
Dear Krishna, I too thank you for offering me an opportunity to talk about Indian Materialism and pay my homage to my predecessors. A line in the Atharvaveda runs as follows: idáṃ náma ṛṣibhyaḥ pūrvajébhyaḥ pū́rvebhyaḥ pathikṛdbhyaḥ («This is paying obeisance to the former-born, the elder, the path-maker sages»).[22] I can do no better than quoting it for the benefit of all.


Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
3, Mohanlal Street, Kolkata 700 004, West Bengal, India
Phone: 91-033-25551288
Email: ramkrishna.bhattacharya@gmail.com

Krishna Del Toso
Università di Trieste
Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici
Via Tigor 22, 34124 Trieste, Italy
Email: krishna.deltoso@gmail.com


References:

AAVV (1998) Routledge Enclycopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 5). Routledge, London and New York.
Ācārya, Saroja (1987) Mārksīya Darśana in Saroja Ācārya Racanāvalī (vol. 1), 61-70. Pearl Publishers, Kolkata.
Basham, Arthur Llewellyn (1954) The Wonder That Was India. The Macmillan Company, New York.
Basu, Rājaśekhara (1981; Bengali era 1388) Jābāli, in Paraśurāma Racanāvali, 27-44. M. C. Sarkar and Sons, Kolkata.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (1996) ‘ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghṛtaṃ pibet’: Who said this?. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 14, 170-4.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (1997) Origin of Materialism in India: Patrician or Plebeian?. Bharatiya Samajik Cintan 20, 12-23.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2001) Haribhadra’s Views on Svabhāvavāda and the Lokāyata. Jain Journal 36, 46-52.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2002a) Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection. Journal of Indian Philosophy 30, 597-640.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2002b) Verses Relating to Svabhāvavāda: A Collection. Sambodhi 25, 75-90.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2005a) Grounds for Hope. Indian Academy of Social Sciences, Allahabad.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2005b) Jain Views on Svabhāva: A Survey. Jain Journal 40, 21-7.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2006) Various Views on Svabhāva: A Critical Survey. Sambodhi 30, 32-60.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2007) What is Meant by Svabhāvaṃ Bhūtacintakāḥ, in Karin Preisendanz (ed.), Expanding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass, 275-81. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2009a) Klāsik Kena Cirāyata. Korak, Kolkata.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2009b) Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Società Editrice Fiorentina, Firenze.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2010a) Cārvākacarcā. Sades, Kolkata.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2010b) Mananer Mūrti. Korak, Kolkata.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2010c) Ore Barṇacorā Ṭhākur Ela Ityādi Bitarka. Anushtup, Kolkata.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2011a) Paraśurām Galpakār. Ababhas, Kolkata.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2011b) Paraśurāmer Caritrasālā. Ababhas, Kolkata.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2011c) Vidyāsāgar: Nānā Prasaṅga (2011c). Chirayata, Kolkata.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna (2012) Rabīndranāther Tin Saṅgī. Korak, Kolkata 2012.
Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1964) Indian Philosophy. A Popular Introduction. People’s Publishing House, New Delhi.
Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1977) Science and Society in Ancient India. Research India Publication, Kolkata.
Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1989) In Defence of Materialism in Ancient India. People’s Publishing House, New Delhi.
Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad and Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya (1990) Cārvāka/Lokāyata: An Anthology of Source Materials and Some Recent Studies. Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi.
Franco, Eli (1991) Paurandarasūtra, in Madhusudan A. Dhaky and Sagarmal Jain (ed.), Aspects of Indology (vol. 3): Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania Felicitation Volume, 154-163. PV Research Insitute, Varanasi.
Franco, Eli (1994) Perception, Knowledge and Disbilief. A Study of Jayarāśi’s Scepticism. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.
Franco, Eli (1997) Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth. Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, Wien.
Frauwallner, Erich (1956) Geschichte der indischen Philosophie (2 vols.). Otto Müller Verlag, Salzburg [English translation: (1973) History of Indian Philosophy (2 vols.). Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi].
Gorresio, Gaspare (1843-58) Ramayana. Poema sanscrito di Valmici (10 vols.). Stamperia Imperiale di Francia, Parigi.
Hicks, Robert D. (1925) Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. With an English Translation (vol. 2), William Heinemann, London.
Jhā, Gaṅgānātha (1999) The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama. With the Bhāśya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara (vol. 1). Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi rep.
Mohanta, Dilip Kumar (1998) Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭer Saṃśayavāda. Samskrita Pustaka Bhandara, Kolkata.
Sukla, Badarinatha (1984; Vikramasamvat 2040) Nyāyaśāstrīyavicārapaddhatyā dehātmavādasya sambhābhanā. Sarasvatī Suṣamā 38, 121-34.
Timpanaro, Sebastiano (1975) On Materialism. Verso, London.
Werner, Karel (1995) Review to Eli Franco: Perception, knowledge and disbelief: a study of Jayarāśi's scepticism. (2nd ed.) xvi, 618 pp. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994. Rs 500. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 58, 578.
Wilkins, Augustus S. (1888) The Epistles of Horace. Macmillan and Co., London.
  

summary

In this paper, which has the structure of an interview, Ramkrishna Bhattacharya answers questions on several aspects concerning the Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy. Taking Bhattacharya’s 2009 book Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata as a starting point, the discussion, beginning from Bhattacharya’s personal experience in the field of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata studies, develops mainly through the ontology, epistemology and ethics of Indian materialists. Cārvāka/Lokāyata ontology accounts for only four elements (earth, water, fire and wind) as primary constituents of whatever exists; however, in later times a, so to speak, ‘reformed’ Materialism took place, according to which also other primary elements would be admitted, opening in this way the door – Bhattacharya argues – to some sort of idealism. The epistemology is of a perception-based kind: being perception the most reliable means of knowledge, inference is accordingly accepted only if and when supported by the senses (consequently, gods, the afterlife, destiny or fate are all to be denied from an epistemological point of view). Despite the criticism put forward by some ancient thinkers, according to whom the Cārvāka/Lokāyata would have professed an ethical view, rooted in an ‘eat, drink and be merry’ lifestyle, nowhere the attested primary sources at our disposal testify such a Hedonistic approach. Moreover, the problem of the paucity of direct and authentic Cārvāka/Lokāyata fragments is also dealt with, along with the explanation of why Jayarāśi’s Tattvopaplavasiṃha should not be considered a text on/of Materialism, as some scholar seems instead to suggest.


[1] Routledge Enclycopedia of Philosophy (1998: 280).
[2] Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5. See Jhā (1999: 153).
[3] Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūta 1.1.5. See Jhā (1999: 153-5).
[4] Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūta 1.1.1. See Jhā (1999: 43-50).
[5] See Bhattacharya (2009b: 201-5).
[6] See Ananta Kumar Bhattacharyya ‘Cārvāka Darśanam’, in Chattopadhyaya, Gangopadhyaya (1990: 452-73).
[7] Sukla (1984).
[8] Manusmṛti 5.56abc.
[9]Perception and Inference in the Cārvāka Philosophy’, in Bhattacharya (2009b: 55-63)
[10] Frauwallner (1956.2: 225).
[11] Franco (1991: 159).
[12] Bhāmatī on Brahmasūtra 3.3.53. See Chattopadhyaya, Gangopadhyaya (1990: 243).
[13] See Bhattacharya (2009b: 92).
[14] See Hicks (1925: 131-2).
[15] Franco (1991: 160).
[16] Frauwallner (1956.2: 216).
[17] Bhattacharya (2010a).
[18] Basu (1981). ‘Jābāli’ was first published in 1927 CE.
[19] Gorresio (1843-58).
[20] Franco (1997).
[21] See Bhattacharya (2001), (2002b), (2005b), (2006), (2007).
[22] Atharvaveda 18.2.2cd



This interview was first published in Annali, (Volume No.71), publication of Università degli studi di Napoli.

Click here for Part I  of this interview

Reproduced with the permission of Krishna Del Toso & Ramkrishna Bhattacharya


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